Briefing

UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL CLIMATE DISINFORMATION LANDSCAPE AND STRENGTHENING THE EU'S RESPONSE

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

Summary

Climate disinformation presents a major geopolitical challenge, one that is escalating in scale and impact. Earlier campaigns primarily focused on discrediting climate science, but today's efforts are broader and more sophisticated. Hostile states, fossil fuel interests and new AI-driven manipulation techniques can increasingly target public understanding of climate risks, push deceptive narratives on the costs of climate action and sow mistrust in international cooperation. These dynamics now directly threaten global progress on climate goals, in addition to societal cohesion. At COP30, the Brazilian presidency placed information integrity on the climate agenda for the first time and launched the Global Initiative for Information Integrity, marking a milestone in the seriousness of this threat.

For the EU, climate disinformation can undermine the EU's ability to build domestic support for climate policies and provides an opening for hostile actors to frame EU climate diplomacy as coercive. The EU already brings considerable tools to this challenge as a first mover on technology and digital services regulations, growing Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) monitoring within the European External Action Service (EEAS) and supporting fact-checking and media literacy. Yet, the magnitude of this challenge requires the EU to take more global leadership, in coordination with international organisations and allies. Multilateral institutions are beginning to treat information integrity as a core pillar of climate cooperation, but implementation still has a long way to go.

At the same time, climate disinformation capabilities from some allies are shrinking. The Trump Administration closed the U.S. State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC), which was the central U.S. government body responsible for identifying, analysing and coordinating responses to foreign information manipulation. The GEC had played a key role in supporting allies and civil society, as well as developing tools to detect deepfakes and other forms of deception. Its closure potentially creates a substantial gap in the international response to threats to information integrity. This absence could increase the risk that disinformation campaigns, particularly on issues like climate and energy, spread unchecked.

This landscape presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU. It is now more urgent for the EU and its Member States to step forward, strengthen coordination and ensure that the EU and partner countries can challenge disinformation effectively, especially in the face of new technology like AI. **To match the scale of the threat, the EU will need to expand its global role, deepening cooperation multilaterally, enhancing support for partner countries, improving strategic communication and investing in tools that protect the integrity of information on climate action worldwide.**

1. Climate disinformation poses a global threat

Globally, since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, climate disinformation has shifted from simply denying climate science to exploiting climate disasters and weaponising narratives that frame climate action as economically or politically harmful for geopolitical gain. These narratives, often amplified by state and non-state actors erode public trust in institutions, weaken democracy, contribute to polarisation, undermine the saliency of policies for decarbonisation and ultimately threaten the security of Europe's future.

The global spread of misinformation has been identified as the biggest threat to climate action by recent research from the International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE), one that can impact public opinion and politicians' willingness to act. Disinformation efforts are shifting towards targeting policymakers and institutions, seeking to stall or dilute climate action. Online manipulation through coordinated networks, fake accounts and automated bots magnifies these messages, giving fringe narratives disproportionate visibility and legitimacy.

Climate disinformation is a challenge affecting the EU's credibility on climate action. Russia has actively promoted false narratives on climate action and claimed that the EU has abandoned its own climate commitments. At the same time, U.S. federal government actors have spread false claims that Europe's clean transition is damaging its competitiveness and driving economic decline, and in particular, that Germany is retreating from renewable energy – presenting renewable energy as failed and flawed. Together, these narratives weaken public confidence, polarise debate and threaten the EU's credibility as a global leader on climate action.

In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, climate disinformation poses a growing security threat for the EU. It could undermine its diplomacy by diminishing partner countries' confidence in the clean transition, potentially distorting perceptions of EU initiatives abroad and creating openings for geopolitical rivals to discredit the implementation of international climate agreements and manipulate public opinion. It is increasingly used by hostile states and non-state actors to negatively impact public opinion around the energy transition. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) includes disinformation as an expanding security threat for the EU.

A key finding from the IPIE is a striking lack of research on climate disinformation in the Global South. Existing studies remain heavily concentrated on Europe and North America, leaving significant gaps in regions that are critical to global decarbonisation and renewable energy expansion. This imbalance is particularly concerning given the EU's strategic priority to support the clean transition in the Global South.

The emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is threatening to accelerate climate disinformation by making it faster, cheaper and easier for nefarious actors to produce and spread false information. Generative AI tools create convincing fake images and videos that can deceive users and exploit climate disasters or distort scientific facts. They make disinformation harder to detect leading to more misinformation on climate change. This is compounded by AI driving recommendation algorithms on social media, intensifying climate disinformation by boosting ideologically driven content for engagement, regardless of accuracy. At the same time, some researchers are working on AI models to identify inaccurate climate information.

This briefing highlights key global trends in climate mis- and disinformation and assesses some current responses to identify gaps and opportunities for EU action.

Climate misinformation and disinformation both refer to the spread of inaccurate information on climate change and climate action, but they differ in intent. Climate misinformation involves false or misleading information shared without the intention to deceive. Climate disinformation, by contrast, is deliberately crafted and distributed to mislead the public for political, economic or ideological purposes. Both terms are used throughout this briefing, as they are interlinked – climate disinformation can amplify and lead to increased misinformation on climate change.

2. A rising multilateral priority

Under the banner of information integrity, combating climate misinformation and disinformation is an emerging multilateral priority.

2.1 'COP of Truth'

As the COP30 host, Brazil championed information integrity, recognising the growing threat posed by climate disinformation and building on momentum in other multilateral spheres **(→ Section 2.2)**. The Belém Package at COP30 negotiated under the leadership of the Brazilian presidency references COP30 as the "COP of Truth", promoting information integrity and aiming to restore trust in climate action by bringing together science, equity and political determination. Brazil appointed a dedicated special envoy for information integrity and placed the issue prominently on the COP30 agenda, aiming to advance coordination at the national, regional and multilateral level as well as among civil society and the scientific community. For the first time in COP history, climate disinformation was formally treated as a global priority and given its own thematic day, marking a significant advancement for bringing attention to this critical issue. This achievement is contrasted by the record attendance of fossil fuel industry representatives at COP30, outnumbering every national delegation except the Brazilian one, and the efforts of petrostates to block the inclusion of the phasing out of fossil fuels in the final agreement.

Under the Brazilian Group of 20 (G20) presidency, Brazil alongside UNESCO and the United Nations (UN) established the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change, which promotes multilateral collaboration to fund research and action. The Initiative launched the Declaration on Information Integrity on Climate Change at COP30, establishing a shared global commitment to counter climate disinformation and promote accurate, evidence-based information on climate change. To date, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay have endorsed the declaration.

The declaration highlights the importance of international cooperation and capacity building to address threats to information integrity, protect journalists, scientists and researchers and reinforce public trust in climate science and evidence-based policy. A key element of the agreement is the commitment to provide funding, particularly for developing countries, to support research on information integrity and strengthen the global response to climate disinformation. The declaration also calls on the private sector to align with principles of information integrity, ensuring responsible and transparent advertising practices that uphold journalistic standards and contribute to a credible climate information ecosystem.

2.2 Other multilateral efforts

The UN has taken a leading role in addressing climate disinformation, highlighting the threats it poses to climate action and sustainable development. In 2024, the UN developed the Global Principles for Information Integrity, which link strengthening information integrity to the advancement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). That same year, misinformation and disinformation were also ranked as the third most severe global risk in the UN's Global Risk Report, identified as an immediate and escalating threat across Europe, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa. This was the first time survey respondents viewed these information threats as a major global vulnerability. Participants in the study highlighted key barriers to tackling misinformation and disinformation, including gaps in data, limited accountability mechanisms, and weak

communication pathways between institutions and societies.

In this context, Heads of State and Government adopted the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations at the 2024 UN's Summit of the Future. The Pact further recognises the risks of information manipulation to human rights, fundamental freedoms and the SDGs. Leaders pledged to build resilience to misinformation and disinformation and strengthen information integrity through capacity development, support for independent and public media and access to timely, science-based and multilingual information.

Around the same time, the G20 under the Brazilian Presidency was also active on information integrity. In September 2024, the Digital Economy Working Group outlined Possible Approaches to Promoting Information Integrity and Trust in the Digital Economy, which acknowledge the delay and risks caused by climate disinformation and call on states to promote consensus on climate change based on expert evidence. Moreover, in the lead up to COP30, there was a significant diplomatic effort to build early support for the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change, such as at the pre-summit forum for the Africa Climate Summit.

2.3 NATO action

As climate change becomes increasingly intertwined with global security dynamics, NATO has elevated the fight against climate-related disinformation to a strategic priority. In 2021, NATO adopted a Climate Change and Security Action Plan, which recognises climate change as a security threat and sets out the intention to mainstream climate considerations into NATO's political and military agenda. Within this, NATO placed countering disinformation as a key priority.

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) states that "climate change is a prime target for disinformation as it is complex, contested, and existential. It is therefore necessary to integrate climate considerations into defence and security discourse." Since 2016, a key priority of the StratCom COE has been to analyse climate disinformation and narratives used by state actors and to map how Chinese and Russian actors are engaging in disinformation in the Arctic and Nordic-Baltic regions, as well as to monitor coordinated attacks on climate activists. The StratCom COE also underscores the need for close cooperation across NATO structures, particularly with the new Centre of Excellence on Climate Change and Security, which aims to build up NATO capacity to address climate security threats to ensure there is a unified response to inaccurate narratives on climate impacts.

NATO's third Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment pinpoints climate disinformation as one of the key challenges facing the alliance, including Russian-driven false claims that the "West" invented the climate crisis to justify expanding activity in the Arctic. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin-backed actors have intensified their climate disinformation tactics. In NATO's assessment, Russia was identified as the primary driver of hostile online narratives about the EU's clean energy transition **(→ Russia's misleading narrative on climate action as "Western Imperialism")**.

3. What is Europe doing?

3.1 The EU's domestic action

For over a decade, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in countering disinformation within its borders. The EU's approach has centred on three main pillars: regulatory frameworks, strategic communication and educational and media-literacy initiatives. The urgency of this agenda has grown significantly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which intensified the spread of energy and climate-related disinformation and underscored the need to safeguard public information on Europe's deployment of renewable energy. While not exhaustive, below are examples of EU actions on climate disinformation **(→ Section 3.3)**.

The EU's regulatory architecture on technology companies is now one of the most comprehensive globally. The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and the Action Plan Against Disinformation intend to engage platforms and advertisers in co-regulating harmful content and demonetising disinformation networks. The Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) further strengthen this framework by imposing legally binding obligations on major platforms to increase transparency around algorithms, content moderation and advertising. The DSA obliges platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including public discourse on issues such as climate change, while granting researchers greater access to platform data to study online information flows. Under the DSA, tech companies face hefty fines if they are found to be incompliant with EU rules.

The EU's tech regulations serve as a critical tool that allow researchers to analyse how disinformation spreads online and as a cornerstone for ensuring that tech companies are held accountable and actively preventing malicious actors from conducting disinformation campaigns online. Given the EU's pioneering role in regulating large tech platforms, its rules have faced attacks from the U.S. arguing that EU standards infringe on free-speech principles and disproportionately discriminate against American companies. President Trump has also sought to pressure the EU to weaken aspects of the digital regulations, at times linking this to the threat of new tariffs.

Beyond regulation, the EU invests heavily in communication and public-awareness initiatives. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) links fact-checkers, researchers and media-literacy organisations across Member States. Public education is another key tool. Resources such as the European Climate Pact Toolkit provides accessible resources that help citizens communicate accurately and confidently about climate science and recognise misleading narratives.

3.2 The EU's role internationally

Internationally , the EU has increasingly framed climate disinformation as a strategic threat to global climate action, democratic resilience and geopolitical stability. The EU, primarily through the EEAS, includes global climate disinformation as part of its broader FIMI mandate, deploying systems to monitor, analyse and counteract misleading narratives, not only influencing the EU internally, but also outside the EU. The EEAS also operates the EUvsDisinfo platform, which systematically tracks, analyses and debunks disinformation cases, including narratives that target climate action.

The European Commission identified disinformation as a key climate risk, committing the EU to strengthen its ability to monitor how deceptive narratives spread across borders and influence public opinion. This includes enhancing the use of policy tools, digital solutions and strategic communication to counter misleading climate narratives. The

Commission specifically states to "also work with partners internationally to address disinformation as a growing societal challenge that is rooted in skewed economic incentives and poses a threat to the functioning of our democratic systems". The EU's Joint Communication on a Global Climate and Energy Vision reinforces this approach by placing information integrity as a key part of global climate diplomacy.

The EU also works with multilateral bodies, including the UNFCCC, G7 and G20. Together, these efforts position the EU as a key global actor in defending the integrity of climate information and safeguarding international cooperation on climate and energy transitions – though more can be done to strengthen capabilities, deepen partnerships across the Global South and ensure that climate diplomacy is systematically supported by information integrity tools.

3.3 Member states' activity

Governments have increasingly recognised the risks associated with climate disinformation in recent years, culminating in their signing of the Declaration on the Integrity of Climate Change Information at COP30. Among the ten signatories are several EU member states – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – some of which have been actively combating disinformation threats for several years.

Disinformation is increasingly acknowledged by European governments as a weapon utilised by foreign forces to undermine domestic policymaking, including on the clean transition, thereby igniting action from several Ministries of Foreign Affairs. France, Spain and Sweden, all signatories of the COP30 Declaration, have set up governmental bodies dedicated to combatting foreign interference jointly with national security services. Their objective is to identify foreign-led digital disinformation campaigns and develop strategies to mitigate their impacts. France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Italy's Defence Minister have recently made announcements on the creation of a "diplomatic and civil reserve" and a "civilian and military unit" to combat the hybrid threat of FIMI and boost their diplomacy. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior recognises that disinformation is a hybrid threat while the Foreign Office acknowledges it impacts trust with partners – Germany's approach to countering disinformation involves several ministries and offices. The recently created Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation (ZEAM), a joint initiative of several Ministries, the Foreign Office and the Federal Government, could serve as a central body monitoring and proactively countering disinformation – although its exact mandate and activities remain to be clarified.

The threats of foreign interference in domestic European affairs have led Baltic countries like Finland and Sweden to focus their efforts on countering Russian disinformation campaigns on their territories, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Poland's Ministry of Climate and Environment has made the fight against climate disinformation a central element of its 2025 EU Council Presidency, especially since the spread of climate disinformation has been linked to attacks to NATO's military infrastructure. Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Department for Strategic Communications and Countering Foreign Disinformation to monitor threats and coordinate with its missions abroad.

EU countries ground their efforts to safeguard information integrity in protecting pluralism and democratic values. During the 2025 Paris Peace Forum, 18 EU countries among the 40 signatories recognised that "independent and reliable information

is an essential public good", including on the "response to climate change effects". Promoting broad-reaching media literacy as well as high-quality and independent journalism are identified as key components of combatting climate disinformation and strengthening democratic institutions.

Member States have supported independent information and capacity building in several ways. Spain has defined an Action Plan for Democracy based on the European Commission's plan from 2020 , seeking to tackle disinformation in media and on online platforms. France similarly raises awareness on FIMI online through its platform "French response", which fact-checks trending publications for disinformation. In 2025, the Danish government sponsored an educational programme for journalists from Brazil, India, Kenya and South Africa to build capacity on the dynamics behind climate disinformation. Germany also strengthens capacity to tackle disinformation on social media by training its diplomats through its Regional German Information Centres around the world.

Overall, many EU Member States increasingly recognise and tackle the security-related and political threats posed by foreign interferences in national information landscapes. Climate action however is rarely a central component of governmental responses to disinformation, especially in its international dimension, leading to a lack of strategic national approaches to countering the specific narratives tied to climate disinformation.

4. Country snapshots

4.1 Drivers of disinformation narratives

The following examples illustrate how climate disinformation can manifest in a few strategically important countries that the EU has strong bilateral partnerships with. In these contexts, narratives or tactics by foreign influences such as the U.S. and Russia can either directly shape the information environment or intersect with existing domestic and fossil fuel interest-driven disinformation, amplifying mistrust in climate action and portraying EU actions as coercive. These dynamics show that climate disinformation threatens not only domestic climate action in these countries but also the EU's geopolitical interests, economic partnerships and climate diplomacy by enabling hostile actors to weaken EU influence.

U.S. fossil fuel interests driving disinformation

As the world's largest fossil fuel producer, the U.S. remains a major source of global climate disinformation. U.S.-based fossil fuel interests, think tanks, political actors, media operatives and industry-backed networks have funded campaigns designed to spread doubt about climate science for decades. The rise of U.S. social media platforms have resulted in these disinformation narratives accelerating online, with disinformation tactics shifting from climate science denial to a "new denial" focused on attacking climate policy solutions and targeting climate activists. At the same time, U.S. federal regulation of social media platforms remains limited, allowing online climate disinformation campaigns to spread unchecked. Taken together, these channels such as industry-financed think tanks, right wing media, conservative political influencers and social networks result in U.S.- originated narratives spilling over in other countries and damaging public trust in climate action internationally.

Russia's misleading narrative on climate action as "Western Imperialism"

Russia has long been a leading promotor of climate science denial, and in recent years its state-backed propaganda networks have increasingly framed the climate crisis as a "Western" plot to block industrialisation in the Global South. A misleading narrative, targeted particularly at African nations, claims that European climate diplomacy is a continuation of colonialism designed to keep developing countries economically dependent.

By positioning itself as a partner to developing countries and an alternative to Europe, Russia seeks to present gas as the only viable pathway for industrialisation. In doing so, Russia seeks to reduce the risks posed by the energy transition to its economy and continue exporting its oil and gas. Russian officials assert that EU climate policies and environmental standards are designed to hinder the growth of emerging economies, while highlighting Europe's continued fossil fuel use. This illustrates how these narratives could be weaponised to undermine EU climate diplomacy and action and gain geopolitical and economic influence.

Russia also deploys media "training" initiatives backed by the Russian intelligence services to influence the media landscape in other countries, with a focus on Africa. Moreover, NATO found evidence of Russia exploiting climate-linked disasters to sow political distrust after climate disasters.

4.2 Disinformation narratives in EU partner countries

Similar pattens are emerging in strategically important partner countries, where foreign and domestic actors use climate disinformation to influence public opinion and weaken trust in international cooperation on climate action and, crucially, EU credibility.

South Africa: foreign influence and domestic amplification

The EU has a long-standing diplomatic relationship with South Africa, supported by a range of bilateral and plurilateral initiatives, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) and the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership. Climate disinformation could pose a threat to the effectiveness of these partnerships.

The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies identifies Russia as a major foreign actor driving disinformation campaigns in South Africa, often capitalising on pre-existing narratives and frictions. At the same time, climate denial content originating from North America can spread across South African social media, often pushed through hashtags such as #ClimateScam and #ClimateHoax, especially during COP summits. These narratives are frequently initiated by right-leaning foreign influencers and then amplified by local accounts. For example, one South African social media personality routinely hosts North American climate deniers on their podcast, showing how disinformation originating outside of the country can influence local communities through social media.

Domestic political rhetoric can also reinforce these dynamics. During COP27, the African Digital Democracy Observatory found a surge in climate-denialist narratives portraying climate change as a hoax engineered by the West to stop African countries from developing their fossil fuel resources. Similarly, in 2021, South Africa's Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, likened environmental activism to "apartheid and colonialism of a special type", arguing that environmental protection was being used to "oppress" South Africa's economic development, comments that have been leveraged to undermine public confidence in climate action and instead frame climate action around stalling job creation.

As a reflection of heightened defiance towards climate action, South African climate activists have come under threat and been targeted. Community leaders opposing coal mines have faced intimidation tactics from industry-linked actors, similar to patterns seen in the U.S. where political and economic vested interests in fossil fuels drive the spread of false narratives against environmental and community defenders. Given that South Africans have a constitutional right of access to information, the state has a responsibility to safeguard this right through information integrity, which is already a promising step in the right direction.

Brazil's exposure to disinformation surrounding COP30

Over past decades, Brazil has grown to become a vital partner for the EU in the areas of diplomacy, climate and energy. The spread of climate disinformation in Brazil represents a geopolitical risk for a trust-based relationship, beyond its harmful effects on domestic public opinion regarding climate action.

Brazil's disinformation landscape on climate change has traditionally been dominated by the agrobusiness and related interest groups, often framing environmental protection as being opposed to progress. On energy, the diffusers of disinformation narratives relayed in traditional media are usually tied to the national oil company Petrobras and revolve around the use of "natural" gas as a transition fuel and the spread of doubts around the viability of renewable energy sources.

In 2025, a surge in mentions of the COP30 was identified in Telegram groups dedicated to conspiracy theories. Echoing the rise of disinformation surrounding COP30, false allegations were circulated about a highway being built to enable delegations to travel to COP30 in Belém, resulting in the cutting down of 100,000 Amazonian trees. In reality, the construction project had started nearly a decade before Brazil announced that Belém would host COP30.

Indonesia and the influence of extractive industries

Indonesia is exposed to foreign economic interests given its significant mineral reserves, key for the energy transition. A survey found that one in four respondents in Indonesia believe the climate crisis is an artificial global-elite conspiracy, suggesting scepticism and resentment among the population towards climate-related measures. With over a half of respondents reporting social media as a main source of information on the climate crisis, there is a high likelihood that disinformation contributes to fuelling these sentiments. This poses a risk to the EU, diminishing the acceptability of future partnerships between Indonesia and foreign governments on advancing the energy transition.

Domestically, recent analyses carried out by the Center for Digital Society show that climate misinformation in Indonesia is usually tied to salient topics around religion, politics and climate alarmism. Disinformation related to climate and environmental research is largely spread by extractive industries, often through subsidiaries of international enterprises, reflecting private and foreign interests in disavowing the negative environmental impacts of their activities on ecosystems. Among their strategies, researchers have identified the use of bots to massively refute the claims of environmental defenders, journalists and local communities, partly by using fake profiles pretending to be affiliated with non-existent grassroots organisations, but also the publication of pseudo-scientific studies and the intimidation of local communities.

Taken together, these cases show that climate disinformation is not a peripheral issue but a strategic challenge affecting regions central to EU climate, economic and geopolitical interests. These patterns underscore why the EU needs to step up its international leadership on climate disinformation. A more coordinated, global approach would strengthen its climate diplomacy, protect the credibility of EU climate initiatives and reinforce multilateral cooperation at a moment when accurate, trusted information is essential for accelerating the transition.

5. Rationale for EU engagement

There is a strong diplomatic and strategic interest for the EU to take a larger global role in countering climate disinformation. The Paris Agreement depends on all countries accelerating climate action, and this requires widespread public understanding of climate risks, buy-in on the opportunities of the transition and on how trade-offs can be managed fairly. Climate disinformation directly undermines this necessary foundation. The IPCC's Sixth Assessment report reflects this concern, finding with high confidence that disinformation has delayed recognition of climate risks and fuelled misperceptions of both scientific consensus and urgency. Beyond slowing global climate action, climate disinformation can create mounting security, geopolitical and credibility risks for the EU.

Disinformation within EU member states can hamper public confidence in climate action as well as negatively impact the EU's ability to speak with one voice in international negotiations. Misleading narratives on the economic cost of climate policies and insufficient attention to the costs of inaction can fuel domestic backlash against efforts to support decarbonisation in partner countries, especially with tightening public budgets. In partner countries, disinformation campaigns can also frame European standards and regulations as strategically motivated or burdensome, sometimes reflecting valid concerns but ultimately aiming to sow mistrust rather than foster mutual solutions.

Internationally, authoritarian actors increasingly push false narratives to stall clean energy transitions, discredit multilateral institutions' ability to solve global problems and gain geopolitical influence in other countries. Such campaigns can weaken trust in EU-funded climate initiatives, undermine global confidence in the long-term benefits of climate action and erode science-based evidence undermining global cooperation. With the Trump Administration being increasingly hostile to efforts to counter disinformation, labelling action as censorship, the EU stands as a major actor capable of sustaining global norms on information integrity on climate change.

6. Key considerations for the EU

As the need for ensuring an accurate information environment on climate change intensifies, the EU can consider the following actions to build on and strengthen its existing efforts:

1. Strengthen coordination across EU and Member States

- Deepen integration between Member States and EU institutions. While several Member States have advanced national initiatives to counter disinformation, more structured EU coordination could help ensure coherence, avoid duplication and leverage shared tools and expertise.
- Improve internal coordination between EEAS, the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA). Ensuring timely and clear communication channels is key so that information threats identified by EU delegations and the EEAS are shared with other departments in the Commission, such as DG INTPA and DG CLIMA, particularly regarding emerging climate disinformation narratives in partner countries.

2. Improve strategic external communication

- Develop proactive, forward-looking narratives and targeted communication campaigns in key partner countries to explain how the EU supports climate and energy projects, counter potential misperceptions and build trust.
- Communicate clearly the mandates of EU institutions and bodies involved in climate disinformation, enhancing transparency on responsibilities.
- Ensure information on climate disinformation is accessible in all EU languages, supporting domestic understanding and reinforcing coherence across Member States.
- Provide more dedicated funding for awareness raising campaigns, capacity building and strategic communications projects countering climate disinformation.

3. Support capacity building on climate disinformation in partner countries

- Expand and strengthen existing training programmes for journalists and media professionals, drawing on Member State expertise.
- Strengthen information integrity capacity within EU delegations, enabling staff to identify and respond to current climate disinformation narratives in partner countries.
- Promote climate risk information in partner countries, particularly in partner countries more vulnerable to climate impacts and more exposed to climate-related falsehoods. This could be linked to wider resilience-building and disaster preparedness initiatives and be led by Member States already active in disaster preparedness, like Denmark or Germany.
- Facilitate exchanges on EU technology and digital services regulations, supporting partner countries in developing their own regulatory capacity to ensure technology companies protect against disinformation threats.

4. Provide diplomatic support and capacity towards multilateral efforts

- Work with Member States having signed the Global Initiative for Information Integrity to encourage participation from all Member States and leverage EU leadership to strengthen this vital forum for addressing global climate disinformation. Additionally, encourage other countries to join the declaration and initiative.
- Enhance NATO-EU collaboration on climate-related information threats. Existing mechanisms such as the EU-NATO Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Resilience and cooperation through the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats offer platforms for exchange, despite the Centre not focusing solely on climate disinformation. The EU can play a strong convening role to promote joint threat assessments, information-sharing and best practices with NATO to support the alliance's growing focus on climate-security risks, which includes climate disinformation.

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